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BETWEEN THE SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS OF 
PROSECUTION AND RECONCILIATION: THE 
KHMER ROUGE TRIALS AND THE PROMISE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
NEHA JAIN* 
The issue of “justice versus peace” has long been at the center of the 
controversy on international prosecutions for crimes in transitional and 
post-conflict societies. Opponents of international prosecutions have taken 
umbrage at the presumption that justice can only be rendered through 
criminal prosecutions by an international tribunal often far removed from 
local realities and voiced their concern about the destabilizing effects such 
prosecutions can have on local peace building initiatives that often provide 
amnesties for participants in mass atrocities.1 International criminal lawyers 
have answered these charges by arguing for a more holistic concept of 
peace in which justice is a prerequisite for a stable society based on the rule 
of law and prevention of impunity, and put forward holding individuals 
criminally responsible in a fair and impartial setting as one of the best 
methods for achieving this objective.2 Thus far, this heated debate has 
rarely progressed beyond the hallowed corridors of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”): there is a rich and growing scholarship exploring 
the tension between the ICC and alternative justice mechanisms, 
particularly amnesties and traditional justice practices. The bulk of this 
literature however, lavishes its attention on the ICC as the prima donna of 
 
* Research fellow, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law; Candidate for the 
DPhil in law, MPhil, BCL, (Oxford University). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
Oxford Transitional Justice Research Group’s International Conference on Transitional Justice in June 
2009. I am grateful to the participants for their comments on the previous draft. 
 1. See, e.g., Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where 
the International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205 (2000); Carlos S. 
Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 
YALE L.J. 2619 (1991) (discussing problematic aspects of mandatory criminal prosecutions in the 
context of President Alfonsin’s prosecutions of human rights violations in Argentina). 
 2. This is particularly argued in the case of exceptionally grave crimes, the prosecution of which 
is considered mandatory by some academics. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The 
Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); Juan E. 
Méndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255, 259-62 (1997); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
9, 17-18 (1996). 
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international criminal prosecutions, often treating the individual actors 
within the institutional structure as minor extras, whose interests come as 
an afterthought.3 Another strand of writing develops on the role of 
particular players in the ICC apparatus, but is inconclusive on their precise 
contribution to the peace versus justice conundrum.4 I therefore propose to 
focus on and develop a more sophisticated theoretical construct of the role 
of the agent who occupies the preeminent position in confronting and 
deciding between these opposing camps: the prosecutor of an international 
or hybrid tribunal. 
I will tease out and suggest possible points of resolution in this debate 
through a study of a recent dispute between the national and international 
co-prosecutors of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(“ECCC”), tasked with prosecuting seniors leaders of, and those most 
responsible for the crimes committed during the reign of, the Khmer 
Rouge.5 The dispute centers on how widely the prosecutorial net should be 
cast so as to best serve the interests of justice. The international prosecutor 
has argued that enough evidence exists to indict more suspects than the five 
who have currently been indicted.6 The national prosecutor has resisted 
 
 3. The omission to specify the exact nature of the contribution or responsibility of individual 
agents within the ICC structure is conspicuous even in otherwise thoughtful and nuanced scholarship on 
the subject. See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions 
and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481 (2003). Notable exceptions include Chris 
Gallavin, Prosecutorial Discretion within the ICC: Under the Pressure of Justice, 17 CRIM. L.F. 43 
(2006); Richard J. Goldstone & Nicole Fritz, ‘In the Interests of Justice’ and Independent Referral: The 
ICC Prosecutor’s Unprecedented Powers, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 655, 660-63 (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510 (2003); Matthew 
R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
71 (2004). 
 5. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 1, 
NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_ 
amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) [hereinafter ECCC law]. 
 6. The five accused, who have been charged with war crimes and/or crimes against humanity, are 
Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), the head of the S-21 prison in Democratic Kampuchea; Khieu Samphan, 
the DK regime’s former head of state; Ieng Sary, the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs; Sary’s wife Ieng Thirith, who was Minister for Social Affairs; and Nuon Chea, the 
Khmer Rouge’s chief ideologue. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Kaing Guek 
Eav Case Information Sheet, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/files/Case_Info_DUCH_EN.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Nuon Chea Case 
Information Sheet, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/files/Case_Info_Nuon_Chea_EN.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2009); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Ieng Sary Case Information 
Sheet, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/files/Case_Info_Ieng_Sary_EN.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 
2009); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Ieng Thirith Case Information Sheet, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/files/Case_Info_Ieng_Thirith_EN.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 
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opening judicial investigations into additional suspects on the ground that 
this would undermine national reconciliation.7 This disagreement signals 
several “firsts” for international criminal law. It is the first ever instance of 
the prosecutors of an international(ized) tribunal8 simultaneously exercising 
the discretion deemed inherent to their function, and reaching divergent 
decisions on whether and whom to prosecute. It also places the ECCC Pre-
Trial Chamber in the novel position of an international judicial organ 
having to articulate standards for the review of prosecutorial discretion and 
decide between competing prosecutorial claims of prioritizing prosecution 
over rapprochement. The conflict is rendered all the more exceptional 
because the ECCC is the only hybrid tribunal that has co-equal national and 
international prosecutors, and which splits the decision-making 
responsibility evenly between national and international counterparts at all 
levels of the tribunal, except the judicial body, where the domestic judges 
are in a majority.9 The dispute therefore implicates issues that challenge the 
seeming coherence of international criminal justice: the divergent aims, 
functions and constituencies pursued by actors in domestic versus 
international criminal trials. 
I begin with identifying the salient features of the dispute before the 
ECCC and considering the extent to which the ECCC law and institutional 
structure provide guidelines for its resolution. I then locate the conflict 
within the larger debates on exercise of prosecutorial discretion on one 
hand and the relationship between alternative justice mechanisms and the 
ICC on the other. I discuss the extent to which these debates will be 
affected by the unique nature of the ECCC as a hybrid tribunal that must 
navigate between the interests of its national and international 
constituencies. Finally, I put forward suggestions for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial review which are not only directed 
towards the specific circumstances of the ECCC, but are also instructive 
with respect to prosecutors and judicial organs of other international 
tribunals that must find a principled method of exercising and reviewing 
prosecutorial discretion. 
 
2009); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Khieu Samphan Case Information Sheet, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/files/Case_Info_Khieu_Samphan_EN.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 
2009). 
 7. Office of the Co-Prosecutors in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
Statement of the Co-Prosecutors (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/press/84/ 
Statement_OCP_05-01-09_EN.pdf [hereinafter Statement of the Co-Prosecutors]. 
 8. Neha Jain, Conceptualising Internationalisation in Hybrid Criminal Courts, 12 SING. Y.B. 
INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009). 
 9. ECCC law, supra note 5, arts. 9 new, 16, 23 new. 
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I. BALANCING PRINCIPLES AND PRAGMATISM AT THE ECCC 
A. The context of the dispute 
In April of 1975, the forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 
popularly known as the Khmer Rouge, took over Phnom Penh, the capital 
of Cambodia and unleashed a four year long reign of terror aimed at 
establishing a socialist, fully independent, and socially and ethnically 
homogeneous Cambodia. This victory signaled the culmination of a 
prolonged armed struggle against the government that had begun in the late 
1960s and had seen the Khmer Rouge gradually increase its control over 
Cambodian territory in the period leading up to 1975.10 The new regime 
renamed Cambodia Democratic Kampuchea and immediately launched a 
radical revolution in which all pre-existing economic, social, and cultural 
institutions were abolished, and the entire population was transformed into 
a collective workforce.11 Within a few days of taking over Phnom Penh, the 
capital and other cities were evacuated, and city-dwelling Cambodians 
were forcibly moved to the countryside for hard agricultural labor.12 In 
their pursuit of a rural, classless society, the Khmer Rouge abolished 
money, private property, and traditional cultural and religious practices. 
Rural collectives were set up, in which thousands died of disease, 
starvation, and overwork. Estimates of the dead range from 1.7 million to 3 
million, out of a 1975 population estimated at 7.3 million.13 
The Khmer Rouge followed a ruthless policy of suppression against 
all elements perceived as a threat to the new order. Central to this policy 
 
 10. See The Group of Experts for Cambodia, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia 
Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, paras. 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/1999/231, 
A/53/850 (Mar. 16, 1999) [hereinafter Report of the Group of Experts]. 
 11. On the Khmer Rouge’s idea of the social revolution, see DAVID P. CHANDLER, BROTHER 
NUMBER ONE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF POL POT 3 (1999); Serge Thion, The Cambodian Idea of 
Revolution, in REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH IN KAMPUCHEA: EIGHT ESSAYS 10 (David P. 
Chandler & Ben Kiernan eds., 1983). 
 12. ALEXANDER LABAN HINTON, WHY DID THEY KILL?: CAMBODIA IN THE SHADOW OF 
GENOCIDE 8-10 (2005); Karl D. Jackson, The Ideology of Total Revolution, in CAMBODIA, 1975-1978: 
RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH 37, 46-48 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1989) (explaining the policy behind forced 
evacuations); Cambodia: Long March from Phnom Penh, TIME, May 19, 1975, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,945394-1,00.html. 
 13. United States Department of State, Background Note: Cambodia (2009), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2732.htm [hereinafter Background Note: Cambodia]. On the varying 
estimates, see, e.g., Michael Vickery, Letter to the Editor, 20 BULL. OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 
377 (1988); Damien de Walque, Selective Mortality During the Khmer Rouge Period in Cambodia, 31 
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 351 (2005); Patrick Heuveline, ‘Between One and Three Million’: Towards 
the Demographic Reconstruction of a Decade of Cambodian History (1970-1979), 52 POPULATION 
STUD. 49 (1998). 
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was the necessity of supplanting any identities that may compete with 
absolute and unconditional loyalty to the state including class, religion, and 
family.14 The family having been one of the most traditional and potent of 
relationships, the survival and success of the state apparatus envisioned by 
the Khmer Rouge required its destruction.15 The Khmer Rouge employed 
several methods to weaken the family structure and sever bonds between 
family members, including separation of family members during forced 
urban evacuations, executions, and collectivization of work and family 
arrangements.16 Families were no longer allowed to eat together or own 
property collectively.17 At the same time, the Khmer Rouge sought to 
appropriate and transform the traditional attachment to family, by 
describing “(1) the intended new society as a one-family society”; (2) the 
Angkar18 as the people’s provider and protector and therefore the rightful 
object of their allegiance, much in the same way as parents; and “(3) the 
political leader Pol Pot as ‘brother number one’ among the people, that is, 
the first-born” and, as such, the most respected family member.19 
The Khmer Rouge also carried out large scale “purges” and “re-
education” programs, not only against segments of society considered 
enemies of the revolution, such as ethnic minorities, intellectuals, 
Buddhists, foreigners, and businessmen,20 but also forces loyal to the 
former Prime Minister Lon Nol and persons considered suspect within their 
own ranks. It also divided people into “base people” comprising ethnic 
Khmer peasants and “new people,” which referred to the urban class 
 
 14. See Kalyanee E. Mam, The Endurance of the Cambodian Family under the Khmer Rouge 
Regime: An Oral History, in GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA AND RWANDA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 127 (Susan 
E. Cook, ed., 2005). 
 15. See ELIZABETH BECKER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: THE VOICES OF CAMBODIA’S 
REVOLUTION AND ITS PEOPLE 237-40 (1986). 
 16. Siv Leng Chhor, Destruction of Family Foundation in Kampuchea, 11 SEARCHING FOR THE 
TRUTH (Documentation Ctr. of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia), Nov. 2000, at 22-23. 
 17. Mam, supra note 14, at 140-43. 
 18. Angkar is Khmer for “organization.” The term was commonly used to refer to the Khmer 
Rouge regime. 
 19. Patrick Heuveline & Bunnak Poch, Do Marriages Forget Their Past? Marital Stability in 
Post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 99, 102 (2006). 
 20. See Ben Kiernan, External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology, in THE THIRD 
INDO-CHINA WAR: CONFLICT BETWEEN CHINA, VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA, 1972-1979, at 187, 192-93 
(Odd Arne Westad & Sophie Quinn-Judge eds., 2006); Dan Fletcher, A Brief History of the Khmer 
Rouge, TIME, Feb. 17, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 
0,8599,1879785,00.html. 
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deemed to be under foreign and capitalist influences, and treated the latter 
as the enemy.21 
Cambodia’s relations with Vietnam eventually led to the overthrow of 
the regime. Low intensity border clashes between the two countries from 
1975 to 1979 escalated during 1978. In late December 1978, Vietnamese 
forces launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia and installed Heng 
Samrin as head of state in the new People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
(“PRK”). The Khmer Rouge battled the Vietnamese throughout the 1980s, 
but the PRK and Vietnam managed to maintain control of most of the 
countryside. By 1989, however, Vietnamese troops had mostly withdrawn 
from Cambodia and a comprehensive settlement was achieved in the Paris 
Agreements of October 23, 1991.22 
The impetus for a tribunal to try senior leaders responsible for the 
crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge came in the form of a letter 
forwarded by the two co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia, Norodom 
Ranariddh and Hun Sen, to the UN Secretary General in June 1997, 
soliciting the assistance of the UN and the international community, similar 
to that rendered in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, in establishing the truth about, 
and bringing to justice persons responsible for, the crimes committed 
during the Khmer Rouge regime.23 The motivation behind this letter, 
however, remains unclear. The Hun Sen-dominated Cambodian 
government which came into power following the UN-sponsored 1993 
Cambodian elections was beset with internal as well as external worries. In 
addition to the bitter struggle between the factions led by the co-Prime 
Ministers, it was experimenting with various strategies to disarm the 
Khmer Rouge and try assimilating its cadre into the Royal Cambodian 
Armed Forces. To this end, it passed a law in 1994 outlawing the Khmer 
Rouge and encouraged defections by its senior leaders.24 At the same time, 
it was heavily reliant on international humanitarian aid for reconstruction 
and could not ignore increasing pressure from the international community, 
in particular the United States,25 to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice 
 
 21. See BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA 
UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79 at 251-309 (2002). 
 22. Background Note: Cambodia, supra note 13; Report of the Group of Experts, supra note 10, 
paras. 36-40. 
 23. Report of the Group of Experts, supra note 10, para. 5. 
 24. George Chigas, The Politics of Defining Justice After the Cambodian Genocide, 2 J. 
GENOCIDE RES. 245, 250 (2000). 
 25. The U.S. Congress passed the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, 22 U.S.C. 2656, Part D, §§ 
571-74 (1994), in April 1994 stating in § 572 that “Consistent with international law, it is the policy of 
the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes 
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for crimes committed during the DK regime. Thus, while nominally 
supporting a possible trial, it also introduced the rhetoric of “national 
reconciliation” into the debate, placating Khmer Rouge fears by 
emphasizing the potential disruptive effects of legal proceedings on peace 
and stability.26 
In any event, the Secretary General responded positively to the letter 
of the co-Prime Ministers by establishing a Group of Experts committee to 
look into the nature of the crimes and explore options for prosecution.27 
The Group of Experts was sensible of the political context in which the 
trials would occur. They noted that though the Khmer Rouge could no 
longer be considered a fighting force, it still retained a key position in 
domestic politics. This was due to the fact that several of its former 
members had defected to and occupied important positions in Cambodia’s 
two major political parties and that these parties counted on Khmer Rouge 
members for support in the areas they still commanded allegiance.28 This 
was reflected in the carrot and stick approach adopted towards the Khmer 
Rouge cadre, including granting of de facto amnesties for crimes 
perpetrated in the post-1979 period, and the amnesty granted to Ieng Sary, 
a former Deputy Prime Minister in the DK Government. The aim, which 
was to encourage defections within the Khmer Rouge ranks and put an end 
to the insurgency, met with some success in the form of Khmer Rouge 
forces loyal to Ieng Sary being formally brought within the Government, 
and the surrender of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, two of the DK 
Government’s most senior officials, in 1998.29 
Mindful of these constraints, the Group of Experts emphasized the 
twin goals of individual accountability and national reconciliation in its 
choice of the category of persons who should be targeted for investigation 
as well as the modalities of bringing them to justice. Maneuvering between 
demands for a large scale prosecution effort that might undermine political 
stability on the one hand, and a focus on only a handful of senior DK 
regime officials that would challenge true accountability on the other, the 
Report of the Group of Experts (the “Report”) recommended that the 
proposed tribunal focus on those most responsible for the atrocities 
 
against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975, and January 7, 1979” and encourage 
“the establishment of a national or international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of those accused of 
genocide in Cambodia.” 
 26. See Chigas, supra note 24, at 251. 
 27. Report of the Group of Experts, supra note 10, para. 6. 
 28. See id., supra note 10, paras. 95-98. 
 29. See id., paras. 44-45. 
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committed during the DK regime. While it did not specify any numerical 
limit, it envisaged about twenty to thirty persons being indicted by the 
prosecutor, based solely on his discretion, taking into account the needs of 
reconciliation and accountability.30 
The Group also considered various possibilities for conducting these 
trials, finally recommending the establishment of an international tribunal, 
similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), 
instead of a trial by a Cambodian court, or a court of mixed composition.31 
This was mainly prompted by fears of undue political interference by the 
Cambodian government in the functioning of a domestic or mixed court, 
thus risking the independence and impartiality of the trial process.32 The 
Report was also cautious about the possible creation of a truth and 
reconciliation commission in parallel with an international tribunal, and 
clearly prioritized the latter, which it hoped would in any event be able to 
contribute to bringing to light the range of atrocities perpetrated by the 
Khmer Rouge and knowledge and reconciliation through the trial process.33 
The recommendation to establish an international tribunal was 
rejected by the Cambodian government, leading to prolonged and difficult 
debates on the “ownership” of the tribunal. Indeed, the increasingly 
contumacious attitude of the Cambodian administration towards the 
tribunal in these tense negotiations led many commentators to speculate 
whether the government had ever genuinely wanted prosecutions, or 
whether they were simply a threat calculated to bring the Khmer Rouge to 
heel.34 The UN was unwilling to compromise on adherence to what it 
deemed minimum standards for an international tribunal, which it 
interpreted to include provisions for an independent international 
prosecutor and a majority of foreign judges. The Cambodian government 
was open to allowing international participation, but only in a Cambodian-
controlled trial that would take place in Cambodia, be governed by 
Cambodian law, and have a majority of Cambodian judges and 
 
 30. See id., paras. 102-11. 
 31. See id., paras. 122-84. 
 32. See id., paras. 133-38. 
 33. See id., paras. 199-209. 
 34. Thomas Hammarberg, How the Khmer Rouge Tribunal was Agreed: Discussions Between the 
Cambodian Government and the UN, SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH (Documentatation Centre of 
Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia), July 2001, at 42, 43-44, available at http:// 
www.dccam.org/Projects/Magazines/Previous%20Englis/Issue19.pdf; Khamly Chuop, Examining the 
Cambodian View of a Khmer Rouge Tribunal, SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH, (Documentatation Centre of 
Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia) Special English Edition, Third Quarter, 2003, at 46, 51-52. 
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prosecutors.35 At one point in the negotiations, the Cambodian government 
even sent a letter to the UN outlining its view on the options for 
international participation in the tribunal: providing a legal team to help 
Cambodian lawyers draft laws and assigning judges and prosecutors in 
Cambodia’s existing courts; providing a legal team alone without 
participation in the trial; or withdrawing completely from the proposed 
trial.36 
A compromise was finally brokered under significant pressure from 
countries such as the United States, France, and Japan,37 culminating in the 
establishment of the ECCC as a tribunal within the Cambodian system and 
controlled by Cambodians, but involving significant international 
participation in the form of assistance by the UN.38 Strictly speaking, the 
ECCC has been set up as an independent institution within the Cambodian 
judiciary39 by a statute passed by the Government of Cambodia,40 which 
incorporates the provisions of the 2003 Agreement between Cambodia and 
the UN.41 It is the only indisputably hybrid tribunal which has a majority of 
national judges both at the Trial Chamber (three Cambodian and two 
foreign) and the Supreme Court Chamber (four Cambodian and three 
foreign) level.42 Decisions have to be adopted as far as possible, by 
unanimity, and in the absence of that, by a “super-majority rule,” that is, at 
least four out of the five Trial Chamber judges and five out of the seven 
Supreme Court Chamber judges must have voted in favor of the decision.43 
 
 35. Chigas, supra note 24, at 256-57. 
 36. Id. at 257. 
 37. See David J. Scheffer, Op-Ed., Justice for Cambodia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at A21, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/21/opinion/justice-for-cambodia.html. 
 38. See Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International 
Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185, 188-90 (2001). 
 39. See Prosecutors v. Kang Guek Eav, Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ 
(PTC01), Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Kang Guek Eav alias “Duch”, 
para. 19 (Dec. 3, 2007). 
 40. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-Cambodia, art. 2, June 6, 2003, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/ 
agreement.list.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Framework Agreement]. 
 41. See Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Research Paper, “Hybrid courts”: The Hybrid Category of a New 
Type of International Crimes Courts, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 190, 200 (2006) (outlining that though the 
statute was passed two years before the 2003 Agreement, it was later amended to incorporate the 
provisions of the Agreement); Sarah Williams, The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers—A 
Dangerous Precedent for International Justice?, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 227, 232 (2004) (stating that 
the constitutive instrument for the ECCC is the statute, and not the 2003 Agreement). 
 42. See ECCC law, supra note 5, art. 9 new. 
 43. See id. art. 14 new. 
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The prosecution team is headed by co-equal Cambodian and international 
prosecutors.44 The ECCC is also unique in that all judicial investigations 
are the responsibility of two co-investigating judges: one Cambodian and 
one international.45 All disputes between the national and international co-
prosecutors and co-investigating judges are to be settled by a Pre-Trial 
Chamber which has a majority of national judges and must adopt decisions 
in accordance with the super-majority rule.46 The Supreme Council of the 
Magistracy, a national organ, appoints Cambodian staff, and also appoints 
international personnel from nominees provided by the Secretary-
General.47 The Office of Administration is headed by a Cambodian 
Director and an international Deputy Director who is appointed by the 
Secretary-General.48 
The current structure of the tribunal bears all the scars of the 
compromises necessitated by the Cambodian government’s intransigence 
and the UN’s conciliatory position towards the end of the negotiations, and 
is at the heart of the dispute between the co-prosecutors. 
B. National Versus International at the Pre-Trial Chamber 
The political wrangles characterizing the inception of the ECCC49 
foreshadowed the current dispute between the co-prosecutors on who 
should stand trial before the court. The ECCC has currently indicted five 
suspects, four of whom were high ranking members in the DK government, 
while the fifth, Duch, headed the infamous Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom 
Penh which was the site of horrific political assassinations.50 The 
International Co-Prosecutor now wants to commence investigations against 
additional suspects on the basis that there is sufficient evidence to establish 
a prima facie case that crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction were 
committed by these persons. The National Co-Prosecutor has curiously 
enough, at least in her public statement on the disagreement, not opposed 
 
 44. See id. art. 16. 
 45. See id. art. 23 new. 
 46. See id. arts. 20 new, 23 new. 
 47. See id. arts. 11 new, 18 new, 26. 
 48. See id. arts. 13, 30, 31 new. 
 49. For an overview of the troubled negotiating history of the ECCC, see Yale Univ., Cambodian 
Genocide Program, Chronology 1994-2004, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/chron_v3.html (last visited Oct. 
24, 2009). 
 50. See supra note 6. See STEPHEN HEDER WITH BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, WASHINGTON COLL. OF 
LAW, AMERICAN UNIV. & COAL. FOR INT’L JUSTICE, SEVEN CANDIDATES FOR PROSECUTION: 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE 12 (2001) (stating Duch’s position and the 
function of the prison in the Khmer Rouge regime). 
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this claim on evidentiary or jurisdictional grounds.51 She has instead 
adduced purely political and policy arguments against further prosecutions: 
they would undermine national reconciliation efforts, especially in light of 
Cambodia’s history of instability; the spirit of the ECCC law does not 
contemplate further prosecutions; and the Court’s limited duration and 
resources support a narrower range of potential suspects for trial.52 
The body that is being urged to make this unprecedented ruling is the 
Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”) of the ECCC, an organ specifically mandated 
to resolve disputes between the Co-Prosecutors. The PTC is composed of 
three national and two international judges and follows the “super-majority 
rule” to adopt decisions—thus, no decision can pass without at least one 
international judge having voted in its favor.53 In the event the national 
prosecutor fails to obtain this super-majority, the default position favors 
prosecution and moving forward with the investigation.54 It is important to 
examine, however, whether apart from this skeletal structure, there is 
anything in the ECCC law that the PTC may look to in order to reach a 
decision. 
1. Prosecutorial discretion in the ECCC law 
At first glance, the discretion afforded to the ECCC Co-Prosecutors 
seems rather limited. The obvious limits of temporal, material, and personal 
jurisdiction contained in the ECCC law serve as the initial limitation as to 
whom the Co-Prosecutors may indict. Thus, only “senior leaders of 
Democratic Kampuchea . . . [or] those most responsible for the crimes and 
serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law 
and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia . . . 
committed during the period . . . April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979,” may 
be brought to trial.55 Additionally, the Internal Rules outlining the functions 
of the prosecutors are closer—compared to the ICTY and the ICTR— to 
the civil law model of Legalitätsprinzip56 that casts a duty on the prosecutor 
 
 51. See Statement of the Co-Prosecutors, supra note 7. 
 52. See Statement of the Co-Prosecutors, supra note 7. 
 53. See ECCC law, supra note 5, art. 20 new. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. art. 1. 
 56. See John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth” and 
Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1561-62 (1978). This is in contrast to the more open policy of 
“l’opportunité des poursuites” in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda which grant the Prosecutor a wide margin of discretion on whether or not to prosecute. See Luc 
Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 162, 165 (2005) (referring to ICTY Statute, art. 18 (1) and ICTR Statute, art. 17(1)). 
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to prosecute every serious crime falling within his or her mandate.57 Rule 
53(1) states that if the Co-Prosecutors “have reason to believe that crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ECCC have been committed, they shall open a 
judicial investigation by sending an Introductory Submission to the Co-
Investigating Judges, either against one or more named persons or against 
unknown persons.”58 Moreover, in the event of a disagreement, the default 
position is that unless a majority of the PTC decides against proceeding 
with the investigation, it shall go forward.59 The obligation to investigate 
seems to extend to the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (“OCIJ”), 
where the Internal Rules declare a judicial investigation to be compulsory 
for crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction.60 The only factors compelling 
dismissal of a case by the OCIJ are lack of jurisdiction, insufficiency of 
evidence, or non-identification of the perpetrators.61 
On closer inspection though, quite like in civil law systems,62 the Co-
Prosecutors enjoy considerable latitude in the operationalization of the duty 
to prosecute.63 They are at liberty to define whether they have “reason to 
believe” that crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction have been committed, 
before launching an investigation.64 They are also in charge of determining 
who and how many persons they consider to be “senior leaders” or those 
“most responsible” for the crimes committed during the DK regime and 
what factors they will take into account in reaching this conclusion. The 
Co-Prosecutors determine whether to commence investigations or 
prosecutions on their own discretion or on the basis of information such as 
victims’ complaints received,65 and are also authorized to change their 
decision on this matter.66 There is no explicit standard of review provided 
for any of these vital decisions. 
Apart from this inherent discretion crucial to the independence of the 
prosecutorial mandate, ECCC law does not appear to contemplate 
situations where the Co-Prosecutors may decline to investigate or prosecute 
 
 57. See Mirjan Damaška, Comment, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a 
German Monograph, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 119, 119 (1981). 
 58. EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURT OF CAMBODIA, INTERNAL RULES, R. 53(1) (Rev. 
3, 2009), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/internal_rules.aspx [hereinafter ECCC INTERNAL RULES]. 
 59. See ECCC law, supra note 5, art. 20 new. 
 60. ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 58, R. 55(1). 
 61. Id. R. 67(3). 
 62. See, e.g., Damaška, supra note 57, at 121. 
 63. See, e.g., Damaška, supra note 57, at 122-23. 
 64. ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 58, R. 53(1). 
 65. See id. R. 49. 
 66. Id. R. 49(5). 
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on policy or political grounds. There is no provision explicitly authorizing 
such a power of refusal in the ECCC Statute, the Framework Agreement, or 
the Internal Rules. The only leeway for introducing such considerations is 
provided in the Preamble of the Agreement, which emphasizes the aims of 
the ECCC to include justice, stability, peace and security, as well as 
national reconciliation.67 The latter concept is not elaborated upon 
anywhere in the subsequent provisions, and in fact must be read in light of 
the substantive law recognizing the Cambodian government’s commitment 
not to seek amnesties and pardons for persons investigated or convicted by 
the ECCC.68 
In the event of a lacuna or ambiguity in the procedural law of the 
ECCC, it may take into account relevant international rules of procedure.69 
The procedural rules of the ad hoc and mixed international criminal courts 
do not deal with standards for the negative exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. While the practice of these courts suggests that prosecutors have 
exercised their discretion on whether and whom to prosecute based on a 
host of factors, including the political implications of the indictment, 
pragmatic considerations such as difficulty in obtaining evidence, and 
ensuring a geographic spread of defendants so as to paint a complete 
picture of the context of the dispute,70 there is no consensus on when and to 
what extent it is appropriate to do so.71 
The Rome Statute of the ICC is the only constitutive instrument of an 
international tribunal that expressly envisages the Prosecutor’s choosing 
not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution “in the interests of 
justice.”72 While the need for national reconciliation and the provision of 
alternative justice mechanisms is certainly acknowledged as a possible 
 
 67. Framework Agreement, supra note 40, Preamble. 
 68. See id. art. 11; ECCC law, supra note 5, art. 40 new. 
 69. See Framework Agreement, supra note 40, art. 12. 
 70. See, e.g., Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice, 5 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 145, 149-54 (2005); Morten Bergsmo, Catherine Cissé & Christopher Staker, The 
Prosecutors of the International Tribunals: The Cases of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY 
and the ICTR, and the ICC Compared, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 121, 135 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000). 
 71. Indeed, Prosecutors of international tribunals have usually denied being influenced by political 
considerations in their work. See Côté, supra note 56, at 178 (quoting Louise Arbour and Richard 
Goldstone). 
 72. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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interpretation of this mandate,73 the ICC Prosecutor has thus far been 
steadfast in refusing to bow to purely political constraints74 and there is no 
clarity on how he is expected to balance the need for prosecution versus the 
interests of justice in the Statute or in the practice of other tribunals. 
It is difficult to see, in any case, where precisely the specific factors 
mentioned by the National Co-Prosecutor for challenging further 
investigations fall within this framework. Neither the spirit of the ECCC 
law, nor limited duration and resource constraints suggest a numerical limit 
as small as five persons on the mandate of the ECCC to call to account 
those most responsible for international crimes committed by the Khmer 
Rouge. The latter has indeed never been proposed as a barrier to indicting 
those considered to bear a high level of responsibility before other tribunals 
faced with similar limitations.75 The former appears illogical given that the 
limb of the ECCC’s personal jurisdiction over those “most responsible” for 
the atrocities has, till this point, only been used in relation to Duch, the 
other four suspects having been indicted as “senior leaders” of the Khmer 
Rouge. It is unlikely that this extension of personal jurisdiction was 
targeted at only one individual.76 
The National Prosecutor’s invocation of the needs of national 
reconciliation in light of Cambodia’s past instability is slightly trickier to 
understand. Past instability is surely only a relevant factor in proceeding 
with investigations if it impacts current public order concerns in Cambodia. 
Even on this kinder interpretation, the potential danger to public order has 
never been a factor against charging particular individuals before other 
tribunals. If anything, the solution has been to shift the trial to another 
jurisdiction, as with Charles Taylor’s trial having been shifted to The 
 
 73. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some 
Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 695, 700 (2005); 
Robinson, supra note 3, at 488-98; Goldstone & Fritz, supra note 3, at 660-63. 
 74. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Building a Future on Peace and Justice, 
Address at the Nuremberg Conference (June 25, 2007). In the context of Uganda, see Linda M. Keller, 
Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice 
Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 222 (2008). 
 75. The completion strategy of the ICTY as well as the ICTR simply provides for resources and 
time to be concentrated on senior leaders instead and transfers cases of lower and intermediate level 
accused to national jurisdictions. See ICTY Completion Strategy, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016; 
Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Enclosure, paras. 6-7, U.N. 
Doc. S/2003/946 (Oct. 6, 2003). 
 76. See Elena Rose, A Predictable Disagreement with an Uncertain Outcome 3, (Oxford 
Transitional Justice Research Group Working Paper Series, 2009), available at http:// 
www.csls.ox.ac.uk/ documents/RoseFinal.pdf. 
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Hague.77 Moreover, evidence that public order will be disrupted in the 
event of additional investigations has been purely speculative. It is true that 
the current Cambodian Prime Minister has gone so far as to assert that 
additional trials would risk plunging the country back into civil war.78 This 
fear is perhaps not entirely fanciful given the enduring influence of the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodian politics till the late 1990s and the deals struck 
in order to co-opt them into mainstream Cambodian life and politics.79 In 
fact, it is widely supposed that at least two of the potential additional 
suspects currently occupy senior positions in the Cambodian army and that 
any further investigations would risk unsettling troops loyal to them, 
especially those stationed in the northwest of Cambodia, a former Khmer 
Rouge stronghold.80 However, there has been no concrete study or survey 
that either refutes or supports these allegations. 
While the PTC has cited studies that predict a possible resurgence of 
“‘anxieties’ . . . [and accompanying] ‘negative social consequences’”81 as a 
result of the commencement of trials as a basis to refuse provisional release 
of the accused pending trial,82 there is little specific evidence supporting 
such disruption. Indeed, one could argue that given the tremendous interest 
displayed by the Cambodian people, including former victims, in the 
conduct of proceedings before the ECCC,83 any sign that they are being 
dictated by external political considerations precluding further 
investigations is far more likely to endanger political stability. This also 
makes the argument on national reconciliation hard to stomach. Unless the 
National Co-Prosecutor is suggesting that selective silence and historical 
 
 77. S.C. Res. 1688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1688 (June 16, 2006), available at http:// 
www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm (Click on “S/RES/1688 (2006)” hyperlink). 
 78. See Ek Madra, Cambodia PM rejects wider Khmer Rouge trials, REUTERS, Mar. 31, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE52U1IZ20090331. 
 79. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. 
 80. See Rose, supra note 76, at 2-3. 
 81. See Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Ieng Sary, Criminal Case File 
No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC03), para. 113 (Oct. 17, 2008). 
 82. See id. paras. 111-17. 
 83. See, e.g., The Cambodian Trial Monitor, News Articles (old), http:// 
www.cambodiatribunal.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=60 (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2009); Grant Peck, Long-Delayed Khmer Rouge Genocide Trial Opens, ASSOC. PRESS, 
Mar. 29, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/WireStory?id=7201040&page=1; 
Cambodia to Resume KRouge Prison Chief Trial, AFP, Mar. 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/418741/1/.html. In July 2009, the ECCC 
reported that the number of visitors who had attended the first ever trial at the ECCC of Kaing Guek 
Eav (alias Duch) had reached the 12,000 mark. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
More than 12,000 visitors have attended the Duch trial, (July 22, 2009), http:// 
www.eccc.gov.kh/english/news.view.aspx?doc_id=299. 
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forgetting are a surer recipe for reconciliation in Cambodian society than a 
more complete accounting of the past,84 limiting the trial process to a mere 
five defendants is unlikely to achieve any lasting peace or stability in 
Cambodia. In a similar vein, simply appeasing former Khmer Rouge cadre 
by withholding investigations or any other kind of enquiry into, or 
acknowledgement of, their past conduct, is a very limited understanding of 
what “national reconciliation” entails.85 
2. Judicial review 
The ECCC Law and Internal Rules expressly designate the PTC as the 
sole and final organ for adjudicating disputes between the Co-Prosecutors 
as well as the Co-Investigating Judges.86 There is no provision concerning 
the extent of review afforded to the PTC in this respect. The PTC has not 
had occasion to exercise this responsibility thus far, and its 
pronouncements on its powers of review have been in the exercise of its 
other function—decisions on appeals against certain decisions of the Co-
Investigating Judges.87 For instance, in the appeal against the Closing Order 
issued by the Co-Investigating Judges in the case of Duch, the Co-
Prosecutors requested the PTC to add a mode of liability and additional 
charges in the closing order against the accused.88 The PTC acknowledged 
the lack of an express standard of review in the ECCC Law, and gleaned 
support for the scope of its review jurisdiction by likening its mandate to 
that of the Cambodian Investigation Chamber.89 It noted that the latter had 
broad powers of review, including examining the regularity of the 
procedure followed and ordering further investigations into additional 
persons as well as offences.90 Drawing on this analogy and in light of the 
 
 84. On truth as a double-edged sword in reconciliation efforts, see David A. Crocker, Reckoning 
with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 43, 49-51 (1999). A country wide 
survey carried out by DC-Cam, one of the foremost not-for-profit organizations working in Cambodia 
in 2002, revealed that an overwhelming number of respondents affected by the Khmer Rouge atrocities 
did not consider forgetting the past as part of any reconciliation effort. See SUZANNAH LINTON, 
RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA 26-27 (2004). 
 85. On the uncertainty of appeasement leading to lasting peace or stability, see Kai Ambos, The 
Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study with a Special Focus on the Role of the 
ICC, in BUILDING A FUTURE ON PEACE AND JUSTICE 19, 25 (Kai Ambos et al. eds., 2009). 
 86. See ECCC law, supra note 5, arts. 20 new, 23 new; ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 58, R. 
71, 72. 
 87. See ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 58, R. 74. 
 88. Decision on Appeal Against Closing Order Indicting Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch”, Criminal 
Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC02), para. 30 (Dec. 5, 2008). 
 89. See id. paras. 40-41. 
 90. See id. paras. 41-43. 
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Internal Rules, the PTC interpreted its authority to extend to conducting an 
independent and de novo assessment of the legal characterization of the 
facts decided by the Co-Investigating Judges.91 
While appeals against Closing Orders of the Co-Investigating Judges 
bear certain similarities to a dispute between the Co-Prosecutors on 
whether to proceed with an investigation—in that both signal the 
conclusion of an investigation into a particular suspect and a specific 
charge—there are important differences between the two. The standard 
used by the PTC to decide in the appeal against the Closing Order was 
simply whether the acts that were part of the investigation can be accorded 
the legal characterization requested by the Co-Prosecutors, and whether 
this should have been acceded to by the Co-Investigating Judges.92 On the 
other hand, in a dispute between the Co-Prosecutors concerning a matter 
involving political judgment and prediction, it is extremely likely that the 
facts are capable of supporting both non-prosecution in the interests of 
stability and national reconciliation, as well as prosecution so as to serve 
accountability. The standard used to assess the soundness of a different 
legal characterization of facts is thus rather unhelpful in resolving disputes 
between two co-equal Prosecutors, both of whose submissions may have 
considerable merit. Is there then anything in the ECCC law or the 
instruments of other tribunals that indicates a presumption in favor of either 
position or a burden of proof requirement? 
A tentative case can be made that the burden of proof would be on the 
National Co-Prosecutor arguing for non-prosecution. This follows from the 
default position in the Internal Rules that unless the majority of judges in 
the PTC vote against it, the investigation should proceed.93 While other 
international tribunals have not had to confront this challenge, the Rome 
Statute of the ICC would also support a higher level of proof for declining 
investigation or prosecution in the “interests of justice” than for moving 
forward with the prosecution. This follows from the scheme of the Statute, 
which accords a greater scope of review of prosecutorial discretion in the 
event that the Prosecutor decides not to proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution, despite the existence of a reasonable basis to do so.94 In 
addition, the responsibility of the Prosecutor to prosecute or investigate 
contingent upon his having a “reasonable basis” to believe that a crime 
 
 91. See id. paras. 43-44. 
 92. See id. para. 44. 
 93. See ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 58, R. 71(4). 
 94. See Rome Statute, supra note 72, art. 53. 
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within the Court’s jurisdiction has been committed must be contrasted with 
his duty to demonstrate that there are “substantial reasons” to believe that 
an investigation will not be in the “interests of justice.”95 
3. The implications of the ECCC decision 
The inconclusive nature of ECCC law enabling a resolution of the 
dispute between the Co-Prosecutors has implications that reverberate far 
beyond the trial of the Khmer Rouge suspects. It is not simply ECCC law 
that does not have concrete answers to the challenges facing the exercise 
and review of prosecutorial discretion; the law and practice of other 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals is also equivocal on this matter. 
Thus far this has, strictly speaking, not been a problem that the majority of 
these tribunals have had to confront and therefore the incentive to develop 
principled guidelines has been marginal. The ICC, however, being not only 
a post-conflict tribunal, but also an international court that has the authority 
to investigate and prosecute while a conflict is on-going,96 will undoubtedly 
have to address this dilemma. It is no surprise then that the legal 
scholarship on this question has revolved around the legal provisions of the 
Rome Statute and the status of the ICC. It is these debates that we shall 
now consider in order to be able to develop a foundation for dispute 
resolution by the ECCC. 
II. THE ICC AND THE “INTERESTS OF JUSTICE” 
A. The Quest for Accommodating Prosecution and Peace at the ICC 
The question of whether an international criminal tribunal such as the 
ICC should pursue investigations or prosecutions into a situation where it 
has good reason to believe that international crimes have been committed 
is, at first glance, a peculiar one. The aim of these tribunals, after all, is to 
ensure that serious crimes do not go unpunished and “to put an end to 
impunity for . . . [their] perpetrators,” thus contributing to general as well 
as specific deterrence.97 The actualization of these lofty goals however has 
proved more problematic and is now the subject of an oft rehearsed debate 
between champions and detractors of a “duty” to prosecute individuals 
 
 95. Id. art. 53(1)(c). This requirement of “substantial reasons” is curiously enough not repeated in 
the corresponding provision concerning prosecutions. See Rome Statute, supra note 72, art. 53(2)(c). 
 96. On the distinction between ex post and ex ante tribunals, see Mahnoush A. Arsanjani & W. 
Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 385, 385 
(2005). 
 97. Rome Statute, supra note 72, Preamble. 
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alleged to have committed international crimes.98 It is worth setting out the 
gist of the arguments of the opposing sides. 
Starting from more modest and traditional assumptions of the benefits 
of conducting international criminal trials for mass atrocities, which 
include retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, 
proponents of these trials have come to see the process as embracing 
increasingly more ambitious goals. International criminal trials are now 
touted as “venue[s] for giving voice to” victims of mass violence, expected 
to create a historical record of wrongdoing, and even to contribute to 
prevention of conflict.99 Retribution and deterrence feature particularly 
strongly in arguments for international prosecutions. The retributive 
argument works at the individual as well as community level—trials are 
considered an effective substitute for the individual retributive sentiments 
of victims,100 as well as a way for the international community to absolve 
itself of blame for failing to act to prevent wrong doing.101 Punishment is 
also considered vital as an end in itself—crimes that are so horrific so as to 
shock the conscience of mankind should not go unpunished.102 Deterrence 
as an aim of international criminal trials is more ambitious in scope than its 
purely domestic counterpart. In addition to the more limited objective of 
“specific deterrence”—preventing a repetition of atrocities in the context of 
the specific countries and situations for which the trials are held through 
isolating and incarcerating the perpetrators of violence—it also 
encompasses “general deterrence” which looks at the global effect of 
 
 98. See the classic debate between Orentlicher (arguing for a “duty to prosecute” serious 
violations of human rights) and Nino (rebutting this claim as excessively rigid and emphasising the 
importance of political context in designing transitional strategies). Orentlicher, supra note 2; Nino, 
supra note 1; Diane F. Orentlicher, A Reply to Professor Nino, 100 YALE L.J. 2641 (1991). 
 99. Mirjan Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 
329, 331 (2008) [hereinafter Damaška, International Criminal Justice]; Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned 
from ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 427, 428 (2004); Developments in the Law – International 
Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1961 (2001) [hereinafter Developments]. 
 100. See Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-making: Truth Commissions and 
International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 485, 491 (1996); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, 
LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 158 (1964). 
 101. See Claude Jorda, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Its 
Functioning and Future Prospects, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 167, 201 (1999); Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald, Address, International Support for International Criminal Tribunals and an International 
Criminal Court: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 1413, 1436 (1998). 
 102. Security Council Resolutions seem particularly prone to this rationale. See Developments, 
supra note 99, at 1969 (citing U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3842d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3842 (1997); 
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994); U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 
3,175th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 (1993)). 
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prevention of impunity through criminal trials in one state that will affect 
the behavior of individuals in others.103 
A more nuanced analysis of the benefits of international criminal 
tribunals and their capacity for preventing mass atrocities has been 
suggested with reference to the potential effect the threat of prosecutions 
can have on altering the cost benefit calculus of using atrocities as a means 
of obtaining and consolidating political power. It is asserted that the initial 
practice of the ICC demonstrates that the threat of prosecution and the 
issuing of arrest warrants, far from damaging prospects for stability, can be 
one of the factors preventing an escalation of violence, stigmatize and 
politically isolate powerful actors, as well as prompt internal divisions 
within and weaken the bargaining positions of established elites.104 There is 
also emphasis on the potential didactic function of these trials—creating a 
public sense of accountability for severe violations of human rights through 
exposure, stigmatization, and internalization of norms and values that 
respect human rights.105 Pro-prosecution advocates assert that it is only 
through justice—establishing accountability for abuses, creating an 
accurate historical record, and providing some relief for victims—that a 
conflict society can transition to a peaceful and stable one based on the rule 
of law.106 
Opponents of international criminal prosecutions pose several 
challenges to holding out prosecutions as the panacea for all ills 
confronting conflict and transitional societies. The first set of arguments 
constitutes a weak challenge to the idea of international prosecutions and is 
born out of a political realist stance.107 It holds that while prosecutions are 
 
 103. See LEYLA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-75 (2002); David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence and 
the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 473, 473 (1999). 
 104. See Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: 
Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 624 (2009) [hereinafter 
Akhavan, Disincentive to Peace]; Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal 
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001) [hereinafter Akhavan, Beyond Impunity]. 
 105. See Damaška, International Criminal Justice, supra note 99, at 345-47; Payam Akhavan, 
Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War 
Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 741-42, 746-51 (1998). 
 106. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 602 (2007). Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to 
Closure: Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2031-32 (1998); RUTI G. TEITEL, 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 28 (2001); Juan E. Méndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 7 (A. James MacAdams ed., 
1997). 
 107. Akhavan characterizes the debate on peace versus justice as a debate between judicial 
romantics and political realists. This is certainly part of, but not the entire, picture as some opponents of 
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undoubtedly a useful tool in the fight against impunity and establishment of 
the rule of law, they are not appropriate in all cases. This is especially true 
of fragile and post-conflict societies, where unless non-prosecutorial 
alternatives such as amnesties or truth commissions are employed, the 
country may never be able to transition towards peace and stability.108 
While this compromise is born out of pragmatism to some extent—we are 
reminded that leaders and powerful figures in a conflict situation will never 
agree to relinquish power unless they have some assurance that they will 
not be subject to criminal sanctions109—the ultimate goal, peace and future 
justice, is certainly an equally important moral good as the prevention of 
impunity.110 
The second set of claims is a much stronger challenge to the very 
notion that prosecutions are the best response to mass atrocity.111 
Proponents of this line of reasoning put forward alternative justice 
mechanisms such as truth commissions and selective amnesties as 
alternatives that may accord more with restorative justice needs, and 
promote societal healing and reconciliation between victims and 
perpetrators.112 Mechanisms such as truth commissions are seen as being 
able to provide a more accurate historical account of the causes and 
consequences of mass violence that would be difficult within the narrow 
confines of the traditional model of an adversarial criminal trial.113 They 
 
international prosecutions challenge them on normative rather than pragmatic grounds. See Akhavan, 
Disincentive to Peace, supra note 104. 
 108. See, e.g., Goldstone & Fritz, supra note 3, at 662-63; Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional 
Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 1-6 (1990); José 
Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies 
Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1425 (1992). 
 109. See Nick Grono & Adam O’Brien, Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes, in 
COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 13, 14 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark 
eds., 2008); Kenneth A. Rodman, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 99, 102 (2009). 
 110. See Rodman, supra note 109, at 125 (quoting Bass who classified legal justice as one good 
among many, rather than a good that trumps all others. Gary Jonathan Bass, Jus Post Bellum, 32 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 384, 405 (2004)); Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 
249, 252, 258 (1996). 
 111. For an excellent overview of the development of this movement in transitional justice 
literature, see Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional 
Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 926-29 (2009). 
 112. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 88-89 (1998); Kent Greenawalt, Amnesty’s Justice, in TRUTH V. 
JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 189, 198 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson 
eds., 2000). 
 113. See Alice H. Henkin, State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon (Conference Report), in 1 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 184, 186 
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are also considered to be part of the quest to find specific solutions to 
particular conflict and transitional situations that contribute to the building 
of a stable social order, as contrasted with a generic idolization of criminal 
prosecutions as universally applicable solutions.114 
Yet another set of challenges casts doubt on some of the stronger 
justifications and aims of criminal prosecutions. For instance, suspect as 
deterrence may be as a viable goal in domestic prosecutions, its efficacy is 
even more doubtful when transposed to the international context.115 It 
would be fanciful to suggest that rational calculations of the probability of 
being held liable before an international criminal tribunal enter into the 
thoughts of leaders or lower level perpetrators engaged in mass 
atrocities.116 Moreover, in light of the small number of accused that 
international tribunals proclaim as the target of their prosecution, this threat 
is highly unlikely to deter the vast number of perpetrators, especially given 
the relative lightness of the sentence an international tribunal can mete 
out.117 Taken together with the fact that unlike domestic acts of violence, 
mass atrocities are frequently committed in a moral climate of societal 
approval and encouragement, perpetrators often do not perceive the 
“wrongness” of their actions and cannot therefore be expected to enter into 
cost-benefit analyses on which deterrence relies.118 Critics also question the 
merit of arguments valorizing the pedagogic and truth telling functions of 
criminal prosecutions.119 
 
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover, Introduction: Conflict, Justice and 
Reclamation, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS 
ATROCITY, 1, 13-14 (Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover eds., 2004). 
 114. See Richard Goldstone, Preface to HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG 
TO BOSNIA 9, 9 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999); José Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights 
Violations Committed by Former Governments: Applicable Principles and Political Constraints, 13 
HAMLINE L. REV. 623, 628 (1990). 
 115. Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the 
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 72 
(2007). The logic of deterrence assumes that the probability combined with severity of punishment will 
outweigh the potential benefits of committing the criminal act. See, e.g., Johannes Andenaes, The 
General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 960, 964 (1966). 
 116. See Damaška, International Criminal Justice, supra note 99, at 344-45. 
 117. See Developments, supra note 99, at 1964-65; Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The 
Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 321, 367, 382-83 
(1999). 
 118. Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 104, at 11; Naomi Roht-Ariazza, Punishment, Redress 
and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological Approaches, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 13, 14 (Naomi Roht-Ariazza ed., 1995). 
 119. See, e.g., Gerry J. Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. 
L. REV. 801 (1997) (highlighting some of the concerns with law as history and ultimately arguing that 
“[A]n international war crimes regime founded on a concern for consistency, legality and impartiality 
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The issue of potential conflict between investigations and prosecutions 
sought to be undertaken by the ICC and alternative justice measures aimed 
at peace and stability introduced by individual states was expressly 
addressed in the negotiations during the drafting of the Rome Statute and 
was deemed incapable of resolution at that stage.120 While models such as 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission were readily 
approved of,121 concerns were expressed about Pinochet-style amnesty 
provisions.122 The drafters ultimately opted for a “creative ambiguity” in 
favor of foreclosing the debate, thus providing some room to maneuver for 
the prosecutor as well as the judges of the ICC to recognize an exception to 
prosecution in exceptional circumstances, for instance in the case of some 
amnesties.123 
 
would be a valuable addition to the international legal system.”); Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Politics 
of Memory/Errinerungspolitik and the Use and Propriety of Law in the Politics of Memory 
Construction, 14 LAW & CRITIQUE 309 (2003) (arguing that the post-WWII trials for crimes against 
humanity risk destroying established legal principles in their attempt to represent historical 
pronouncement and national values); Martii Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX 
PLANCK U.N. Y.B. 1 (2002) (addressing the difficulty encountered in establishing an unambiguous 
historical truth in international criminal trials). 
 120. Robinson, supra note 3, at 481; Jessica Gavron, Amnesties in the Light of Developments in 
International Law and the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
91, 107 (2002). One camp firmly favored prosecutions as the sole response while the other was 
reluctant to lay down a strict rule that would mandate prosecutions in all cases. The U.S. delegation 
went so far as to circulate a “non-paper” advocating the latter stance. Ruth Wedgwood, The 
International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 93, 96 (1999). 
 121. The assumption that “legitimate” forms of truth commissions would never fall foul of the ICC 
is echoed in Kofi Annan’s statement: “It is inconceivable that, in such a case, the Court would seek to 
substitute its judgement [sic] for that of a whole nation which is seeking the best way to put a traumatic 
past behind it and build a better future.” Kofi Annnan, Speech at the Witwatersrand University 
Graduation Ceremony (Sept. 1, 1998) quoted in Villa-Vicencio, supra note 1, at 222. 
 122. Greenawalt, supra note 106, at 617-18. 
 123. See Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 522 (1999) (quoting Phillipe Kirsch, who contends that 
the provisions to the Rome Statute reflect “creative ambiguity”). There is significant controversy on the 
extent to which the Rome Statute provides a leeway for non-prosecutorial alternatives. Most 
commentators suggest that will be permitted only in the most exceptional of circumstances. See, e.g., 
John Dugard, Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions, in THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 693, 701 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); 
Stahn, supra note 73, at 708. There are also those, however, who fear that the ICC has, or may be 
interpreted, however falsely, to have foreclosed alternative justice mechanisms. See, e.g., John M. 
Czarnetzky & Ronald J. Rychlak, An Empire of Law?: Legalism and the International Criminal Court, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55 (2003); Villa-Vicencio, supra note 1, at 205 (“[T]he advent of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) represents a major triumph over lawlessness that is . . . legally a 
little frightening . . . because it could be interpreted, albeit incorrectly, as foreclosing the use of truth 
commissions, which could otherwise encourage political protagonists to turn away from ideologically 
fixed positions that make for genocide and instead to pursue peaceful co-existence and national 
reconciliation.”). 
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The initial practice of the ICC has already invited staunch supporters 
as well as critics on the peace versus justice conundrum. For instance, the 
ICC’s intervention in Uganda at the behest of the Ugandan government and 
its issuance of arrest warrants against top Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) 
leaders has been criticized as having put an end to all hope for a cessation 
of the conflict by removing any incentive for the LRA to negotiate, thus 
jeopardizing local peace initiatives and rendering the local civilian 
population increasingly vulnerable to attack.124 It has also been accused of 
prioritizing a particular version of retributive justice over local values that 
embrace acknowledgement, forgiveness, reconciliation, and integration, 
such as culturally enshrined traditional Acholi rituals of reconciliation.125 
Pro-ICC interventionists have simultaneously applauded the ICC’s actions 
in Uganda for having weakened the LRA by pressuring Sudan, which had 
been crucial to the LRA’s success, to stop harboring rebels, and by creating 
divisions within the LRA leadership by isolating top leaders.126 They 
emphasize that Uganda’s referral of the situation to the ICC dramatically 
altered the political and military situation in which the LRA was able to 
operate with impunity—with its atrocities having peaked in the period 
immediately preceding the referral—by weakening the LRA’s military base 
and forcing formerly defiant leaders to come to the negotiating table.127 
The controversy still defies an easy resolution and various suggestions 
have been put forward as to how the ICC should go about walking the 
tightrope between prosecutions and respect for alternative justice 
mechanisms and peace processes in the societies in which it could 
potentially intervene.128 One of the more promising solutions advocated is 
that the ICC should defer to non-prosecutorial alternatives only when they 
serve the same goals, in equal or better measure, as those that the ICC has 
been set up to achieve: prevention of impunity, retribution, general and 
 
 124. See, e.g., Josefine Volqvartz, ICC under fire over Uganda probe, CNN, Feb. 23, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/02/23/uganda.volqvartz/index.html; Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, 
The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for Northern 
Uganda, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 179, 180 (2006). 
 125. David Lanz, The ICC’s Intervention in Northern Uganda: Beyond the Simplicity of Peace vs. 
Justice, 9-10 (The Fletcher Sch. Inst. for Hum. Security Working Paper Series, May 2007), available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnid Filename/PANA-78VKGJ-
full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf. 
 126. Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State 
Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 403, 416-20 (2005) [hereinafter 
Akhavan, Lord’s Resistance Army]; Grono & O’Brien, supra note 109, at 15-16. 
 127. Akhavan, Lord’s Resistance Army, supra note 126, at 404, 416-20; Grono & O’Brien, supra 
note 109, at 15-16. 
 128. See Dugard, supra note 123, at 701-03. 
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specific deterrence, truth telling, and reparations for victims.129 
Commentators have especially proposed criteria that alternative justice 
mechanisms like truth commissions should satisfy if they are to be 
considered legitimate and necessary bodies for promoting these goals of 
international justice.130 While the exact requirements vary,131 most insist 
upon the commission’s being independent of the government and the result 
of a democratic decision making process. It should be adequately resourced 
so as to be able to conduct thorough investigations and hold perpetrators 
publicly accountable. Victims should be closely involved in the processes 
of the commission and the information obtained from the process should be 
widely disseminated.132 
Perhaps the most interesting interpretation of the ICC’s obligations in 
such a situation comes from the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) own 
understanding of the “interests of justice” provision in Article 53 of the 
Rome Statute, which is a legitimate ground for the Prosecutor to not 
proceed with an investigation or prosecution.133 The OTP’s Policy Paper is 
explicit that in all cases of international crimes that meet the jurisdiction 
and admissibility tests of the Rome Statute, given the international trend 
towards accountability and the object and purpose of the Statute itself, the 
presumption will always favor investigation or prosecution.134 The paper 
recognizes the “complementary role” that national prosecutions, 
reparations programs and other truth and reconciliation seeking traditional 
mechanisms can play as part of a more comprehensive approach to 
justice.135 However, it cautions that while the “interests of justice” do not 
only encompass a narrow vision of purely criminal justice, they are also not 
 
 129. Linda M. Keller, The False Dichotomy of Peace versus Justice and the International Criminal 
Court, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 12, 34-47 (2008). On the goals of international criminal justice, see, e.g., 
MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (2007); Ralph Henham, 
The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 64, 80-81 (2003); 
Danner, supra note 4, at 531 (noting the ICC’s aims as including the promotion of retribution and 
reconciliation so as to preserve international order). 
 130. Goldstone & Fritz, supra note 3, at 664-65. 
 131. See, e.g., Villa-Vicencio, supra note 1, at 216-17; Douglass Cassel, Lessons from the 
Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 197, 219-20 (1996); Priscilla Hayner, International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation 
of Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 178-80 (1996). 
 132. Goldstone & Fritz, supra note 3, at 664. 
 133. Int’l Crim. Ct. [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, 1 
(Sept. 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-Interests OfJustice 
.pdf. 
 134. Id. at 2-4. 
 135. Id. at 7-8. 
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broad enough to include all issues of peace and security. The latter are best 
addressed by other institutions such as the UN Security Council.136 
The Policy Paper is perhaps more interesting for what it is silent on, 
rather than for what it affirms. It refuses to go into any details on the 
criteria it will use, for instance, in considering whether or not to proceed in 
the interests of justice. While it acknowledges the complementary role of 
non-prosecutorial mechanisms as part of a broader understanding of justice, 
through its default presumption favoring prosecution it implicitly suggests 
a hierarchy of strategies for dealing with international crimes, in which 
criminal prosecutions occupy the top tier. Moreover, its 
compartmentalization of issues of “justice” and issues of “peace” is quite 
artificial, especially in the absence of any elucidation on the bright line 
dividing the two.137 One would imagine that in most cases of conflict and 
post-conflict societies confronting the challenge of bringing the 
perpetrators to justice and establishing a stable society, the two would be 
too closely intertwined for any institution to be able to decide on one, 
without having to automatically assess the other. 
B. The Institutional Balance Struck at the ICC 
Decisions on whether to investigate or prosecute a “situation” before 
the ICC depend on the collective functioning of, and consensus between, 
three different bodies, of which one is independent of the ICC structure—
the Security Council. Not only may the Security Council trigger the ICC’s 
jurisdiction by referring to it any situation where it believes a crime within 
the Court’s mandate has been committed,138 in one of the more 
controversial additions to the ICC Statute, the Security Council has been 
accorded the power to defer prosecution or an investigation by the ICC for 
a period of 12 months by passing a Resolution under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. The deferral is renewable and, theoretically, there is no limit 
to the number of deferrals the Security Council may seek.139 The drafting 
history of Article 16 suggests that the provision did not intend to accord a 
 
 136. Id. at 8-9. 
 137. Contra Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security and Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EMERGING 
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 183, 199 (Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 
2008) (suggesting a distinction between the two as individual (interests of justice) and collective 
(interests of peace and security). For criticism that this distinction unnecessarily fetters prosecutorial 
discretion and indirectly amends the Rome Statute, see William Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. 
Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731, 749 (2008). 
 138. Rome Statute, supra note 72, art. 13(b). 
 139. Id. art. 16. 
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subordinate status to the ICC vis-à-vis the Security Council, or to 
compromise its functional independence.140 
A strong case has been made that political concerns such as national 
reconciliation and stability are the exclusive preserve of the Security 
Council acting under its Chapter VII mandate to maintain international 
peace and security. Thus, any such policy matters should be a matter for the 
Security Council to decide on, and if warranted, defer prosecution or 
investigation into a matter that could otherwise potentially be prosecuted 
before the ICC.141 This would also be the only way to safeguard the 
position of the ICC and its prosecutor as independent and apolitical bodies 
impartially administering justice.142 It is further argued that the Rome 
Statute does not provide any basis for the prosecutor exercising his 
discretion on whether and whom to prosecute on purely political 
considerations. Not only would such politicization severely undermine the 
prosecutor’s mandate to indict senior leaders allegedly responsible for mass 
atrocities, but it is also a convenient shield that countries could easily 
invoke to avoid ICC investigation. There is a danger that the ICC would 
then end up treating identical cases differently based on a political 
judgment and also compromise the possibility of short-term deterrence as a 
goal of international criminal justice processes.143 
These are powerful and legitimate concerns that should undoubtedly 
give the prosecutor some pause for thought before allowing political 
considerations to influence a decision on whether the prosecution would be 
in the interests of justice. Nevertheless, the institutional role of the 
prosecutor of an international or hybrid court is inevitably political to some 
 
 140. The initial draft by the International Law Commission provided that a prosecution arising 
from a situation dealt with by the Security Council could not be initiated by the ICC unless authorized 
by the Council. “This formulation was opposed on the ground that it would disrupt the ability of the 
ICC to function independently. A compromise was sought by the Singapore proposal, whereby no 
prosecution or investigation could be commenced by the ICC in the event of a ‘direction’ to this effect 
by the Security Council. In addition to the terms of the Singapore proposal, Canada recommended a 12-
month renewable deferral period. The final changes were made with the Costa Rican and the British 
proposals, which required a formal and specific decision of the Security Council, and replaced the word 
‘direction’ with ‘request’.” Neha Jain, A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the 
Security Council and the International Criminal Court, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 239, 246 (2005). 
 141. See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, HUM. RTS. WATCH POL’Y PAPER: THE MEANING OF “THE 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE” IN ARTICLE 53 OF THE ROME STATUTE (June 2005), http:// 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2005_ICC_Interests_of_Justice.pdf [hereinafter HRW 
PAPER]. 
 142. Id. at 7-8; Giuliano Turone, Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor, in THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1137, 1142-3 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 
2002). 
 143. HRW PAPER, supra note 141, at 14-15. 
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extent.144 Since no international court, including the ICC, has any powers 
of arrest to enforce its warrants, or the organizational apparatus to compel 
states to assist in investigative and other efforts, the successful functioning 
of these courts depends greatly on the cooperation of states and other non-
governmental and civil society bodies.145 Thus, decisions on whom to 
prosecute or investigate, and when and how to do so, inevitably contain an 
underlying political component. The prosecutor can afford to ignore these 
considerations only at the risk of endangering the entire trial process.146 
Moreover, it is overly optimistic to expect the Security Council always to 
act to defer investigation or prosecution whenever a situation could 
potentially threaten national stability or peace processes.147 Absolving the 
prosecutor of all responsibility of the destabilizing effects of prosecution 
would be an extreme agent relativistic position that assumes one is only 
responsible for one’s actions, never mind someone else’s actions in relation 
to the same matter.148 This would be a naively myopic attitude to the 
problems of international peace and justice and makes the stance of former 
Prosecutors149 as well as academics150 who argue that an international 
prosecutor must be above all political considerations hard to understand. 
While it is certainly true that the Prosecutor should not compromise his 
independence by giving in to political or other pressures from different 
interest groups, to ignore important policy issues that would greatly impact 
the legitimacy as well as efficacy of prosecution efforts would be a 
 
 144. See Côté, supra note 56, at 169-71 (arguing that it is hard to imagine a Prosecutor would 
always be immune from political considerations in matters that are closely allied with wide reaching 
political interests). 
 145. See Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 96, at 399-400; Jan Wouters et al., The International 
Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor: Navigating between Independence and Accountability?, 8 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 273, 285-86 (2008). This has been the case even for UN backed tribunals such as 
the ICTY and the ICTR. See, e.g., RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY 90-91 (2004); KINGSLEY 
CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 61 (2006). 
 146. See Brubacher, supra note 4, at 92-94. 
 147. See Rodman, supra note 109, at 120. 
 148. On agent relativism, see John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, CRIM. L. & PHIL. 127, 132 
(2007). 
 149. See, e.g., RICHARD GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES 
INVESTIGATOR 132 (2000); Louise Arbour, Keynote Speech at the International Conference on War 
Crimes Trials (Nov. 8, 1998), quoted in KERR, supra note 145, at 178. 
 150. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 312-13 (1997). 
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seriously misguided stance to the dilemmas posed by the quest for 
justice.151 
The ICC and its Prosecutor have indeed been compelled to recognize 
this constraint to their mandate in the recent furor over the decision of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber granting the Prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant 
against incumbent President Al-Bashir in Sudan for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed in Darfur.152 The move prompted immediate 
opposition by the Sudanese government and its allies—the African Union 
and the Arab League—in addition to support from China and Russia.153 
Bashir also took strong retaliatory measures, expelling and shutting down 
international and domestic aid groups providing critical humanitarian 
assistance to civilians from Sudan, thus underscoring the international 
community’s co-dependent relationship with Sudan and engineering a 
conflict between the demands of peace versus justice.154 The prospects of 
the arrest warrant being executed grew dimmer as Bashir continued to 
travel freely in Africa. The Arab States155 and the Arab League,156 as well 
as the African Union,157 decided to follow a policy of non co-operation 
with the ICC on execution of the arrest warrant. This is not to suggest that 
the Prosecutor should not have pursued the situation in Sudan at all; it 
simply signals the importance of the Prosecutor and the ICC’s being 
 
 151. In a similar vein, see Kenneth A. Rodman, Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence, 30 
HUM. RTS. Q. 529, 557 (2008) (“Given the dependence of law on politics, it is incumbent on the 
prosecutor to adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach to any political processes that might put an end to criminal 
violence and establish the conditions under which international criminal justice can play a role—even if 
that role is circumscribed by power realities.”). 
 152. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc639078.pdf. 
 153. Victor Peskin, Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s Pursuit of 
Accountability in Uganda and Sudan, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 675 (2009). 
 154. Id. at 676. See also Stephanie McCrummen & Colum Lynch, Sudan Ousts Aid Groups after 
Court Pursues President, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 5, 2001, at A01; Lynsey Addario & Lydia 
Polgreen, Aid Groups’ Expulsion, Fears of More Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at A6. 
 155. Peskin, supra note 153, at 676-77. 
 156. Michael Slackman & Robert F. Worth, Setting Aside Divisions, Arab Leaders Rally Behind 
Sudan’s President at a Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, at A5. 
 157. South Africa later defied this Resolution by stating that it is under an international legal 
obligation to co-operate with the ICC. SA will Enforce Bashir Warrant, TIMES (London), July 31, 2009, 
available at http://www.thetimes.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=1042521. Uganda and Botswana also 
chose to ignore the decision. Botswana Rebels Against AU over Bashir, ABC NEWS, July 5, 2009, 
available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/05/2617219.htm; Cherie Booth & Max du 
Plessis, Africa’s Obstruction of Justice, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/18/darfur-bashir-african-union-icc. 
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sensitive to the political context in which they operate and the possible 
repercussions of their actions in the communities affected by their actions. 
The other two organs charged with the responsibility of deciding on 
investigations and prosecutions, and which are within the ICC structure, are 
the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber. As mentioned earlier, the Rome 
Statute provides the Pre-Trial Chamber with proprio motu powers to 
review a decision of the Prosecutor based entirely on the “interests of 
justice” only when the Prosecutor decides not to proceed with the 
investigation or prosecution, whether it relates to the investigation into a 
certain situation or to prosecutions against specific individuals. This was 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in its decision in the Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan158 where the Chamber emphasized that the meaning of the 
phrase “interests of justice” was not fixed and the Prosecutor was 
authorized by the Rome Statute to exercise his discretion on whether to 
prosecute or investigate based on a non exhaustive list of factors.159 The 
Chamber could review the exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion based on 
this criterion only when he chose not to proceed with the investigation and 
not in the case when he concluded that an investigation or prosecution 
would not be detrimental to justice.160 In the latter scenario, the power as 
well as the responsibility for the assessment lay solely with the 
Prosecutor.161 
The Pre-Trial Chamber thus sets up a clear division of authority within 
the ICC framework for decisions related to investigation and prosecution, 
and in doing so, indirectly creates a hierarchy between the different goals 
that can be pursued by international criminal tribunals. In deciding that it 
has no power of review when the Prosecutor decides that continuing the 
investigative or trial process would not hurt the interests of justice, and that 
there is no obvious limit to what factors fall within the definition, the 
Chamber adopts a subordinate position compared to the Prosecutor in the 
decision making process on proceeding with a case (with the limited 
exception of reviewing the admissibility criteria). In contrast, it is silent on 
the extent of its review jurisdiction in the event that the Prosecutor decides 
not to prosecute, while acknowledging that it has proprio motu powers of 
oversight in this situation. This scheme strongly suggests that the Chamber 
views prosecution of individuals reasonably believed to have participated 
 
 158. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05, Decision on Application Under Rule 103, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I (Feb. 4, 2009). 
 159. Id. paras. 17-18. 
 160. Id. paras. 21-24, 29-30. 
 161. Id. paras. 29-30. 
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in mass crimes to be the default or main mandate of the ICC, and any 
decisions not to prosecute as the exception, which must be justified. The 
standard of review in the latter case is the Prosecutor being able to 
demonstrate that there are “substantial reasons” to believe that the 
prosecution will adversely impact the interests of justice.162 There is no 
decision of the ICC, however, elucidating how this standard would be 
applied in practice. 
The same ambiguity applies to what yardstick should be used by the 
Prosecutor to measure the potential adverse impact of prosecutions or 
investigations on the interests of justice.163 Negotiations leading up to the 
adoption of the Rome Statute indicate that the specter of a freewheeling 
unaccountable Prosecutor was one of the major sticking points for 
countries, including those with adversarial systems such as the United 
States.164 Prosecutorial discretion under the Rome Statute is therefore 
subject to various checks and balances. Apart from the supervisory powers 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the deferral authority of the Security Council 
mentioned above, the Prosecutor is obligated to inform all State parties, 
especially those that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the relevant 
crimes, when he commences an investigation on his own, or pursuant to a 
State party referral.165 He must also notify the Security Council, the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the referring State Party of his decision not to prosecute 
based on the interests of justice.166 Further, any person under investigation 
or prosecution may seek the Prosecutor’s disqualification on grounds of 
partiality.167 
Despite these and other limitations, commentators have voiced their 
skepticism that given the ambivalence of the discretionary power not to 
pursue further investigations or prosecutions based upon the demanding 
language of “justice” it is not easy to be confident that a “judgment of high 
politics and prudence” will be made on a principled basis by the 
Prosecutor.168 Apart from the general proposals adverted to earlier for the 
 
 162. Rome Statute, supra note 72, art. 53(1)(c). 
 163. Academic writing also mostly does not provide detailed criteria on this matter. See, e.g., 
Brubacher, supra note 4, at 83-84. 
 164. Chris Gallavin, supra note 3, at 44-45; Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, The Role Of The 
International Prosecutor, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE 175, 181 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
 165. Rome Statute, supra note 72, art. 18(1). 
 166. Id. art. 53(2)(c). 
 167. Id. art. 42(8)(a). 
 168. Ruth Wedgwood, supra note 120, at 97 (1999). See Ohlin, supra note 137, at 188 (arguing that 
it would in fact be difficult to think of a factor that could not be subsumed within the meaning of 
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ICC’s potential reconciliation of peace and justice needs,169 most 
suggestions regarding this dilemma have posed a “procedural solution” to 
prosecutorial decision ostensibly making the exercise of discretion by the 
Prosecutor more objective and susceptible to external assessment.170 An 
excellent example of this is the system of ex ante prosecutorial guidelines 
advocated by Danner, who focuses on enhancing the legitimacy of 
prosecutorial decision-making. Danner grounds her analysis of legitimacy 
in the work of Abram and Antonia Chayes, to argue that an international 
norm is legitimate if it emanates from fair and accepted procedure; is 
applied equally and without invidious discrimination; and does not offend 
minimum standards of fairness and equity.171 She puts forward a model of 
prosecutorial legitimacy where ex ante guidelines that are publicly 
promulgated provide neutral and transparent criteria to independently 
assess whether decisions have been made in a fair and equal manner by the 
Prosecutor.172 While this model undoubtedly would be helpful in 
constraining arbitrariness, it has been powerfully criticized on two main 
counts. First, it fails to directly confront the substantive policy conflicts 
faced by the ICC Prosecutor, who can hardly claim special expertise in 
resolving them in the context of a post-conflict society he may have little 
knowledge of. Second, it ignores the “democracy deficit” of international 
institutions such as the ICC when compared with national legal systems 
that provide for such guidelines. While domestic prosecutors are ultimately 
accountable to the democratic national processes of their countries and can 
be expected to reflect societal values in making substantive policy 
decisions, this is not true of the ICC and its Prosecutor, which must find 
some way to reduce the tension between its own institutional goals and the 
issues confronting the country that is affected by their actions.173 
 
“interests of justice”); Alfred P. Rubin, The International Criminal Court: Possibilities for 
Prosecutorial Abuse, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 162-63 (2001) (considering the various possible 
meanings of justice in the context of the Rome Statute). 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 129-133. 
 170. There is considerable support for this solution in literature. See, e.g., Avril McDonald & 
Roelof Haveman, Prosecutorial Discretion – Some Thoughts on ‘Objectifying’ the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion by the Prosecutor of the ICC, 2 (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/mcdonald_haveman.pdf; Héctor Olásolo, The Prosecutor of 
the ICC Before the Initiation of Investigations: A Quasi-Judicial or a Political Body?, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. 
REV. 87 (2003); Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and 
a Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293 (2005); Robinson, supra note 3. 
 171. Danner, supra note 4, at 535-36. 
 172. Id. at 552. 
 173. Greenawalt, supra note 106, at 653-58. 
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The debate on the best institutional fit between various organs of the 
ICC who could potentially decide on when not to prosecute in the interests 
of justice thus appears to be highly fractured and no viable solution seems 
readily forthcoming. Moreover, any proposal that relies on according more 
power to the Security Council for this decision would not be of much value 
for other international or hybrid tribunals that do not envisage the Council 
playing a role in the trial process apart from the inception stage. 
III. LESSONS FOR CAMBODIA AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL(IZED) TRIBUNALS 
It may appear questionable to employ the disputed and half formed 
proposals of the ICC debate to resolve the problem of prosecutorial 
discretion at the ECCC, which is, moreover, a hybrid tribunal with a very 
different history and structure from the ICC. These very differences, 
however, have the potential to help us inch closer to developing a 
principled solution. 
Amongst the most telling points of difference between the ECCC and 
the ICC are that the former is a post-conflict tribunal, and a hybrid one. 
While this does not mean that the ECCC can predict for certain the 
consequences of its actions for Cambodian society, it nevertheless has the 
luxury to be able to operate in less volatile conditions than the ICC and to 
assess the possible repercussions of its actions. Partly because of the 
situations of ongoing conflict in the countries in which the ICC has opened 
investigations and issued arrest warrants, the various actors in these 
situations have been compelled to play a highly speculative game with each 
player—including the ICC, the government, the warring factions, human 
rights bodies, victims’ representatives, and the international community—
acting and reacting to what they suspect other actors will do in response to 
the ICC’s involvement. In the chaos of competing voices and positions, one 
can hardly wonder at the fact that the ICC, ultimately an outsider and a 
relative newcomer to the politics of the countries it is now trying to operate 
in, has struggled to find its feet and occasionally floundered. It has 
therefore been seen as easy prey for condemnation on account of taking 
sides in the domestic affairs of a country simply by virtue of factoring 
political considerations into its decision making, and has also been charged 
with being the tool of a particular constituency such as the government in 
its selection of the category of individuals it has chosen to pursue.174 
Similar accusations are harder to level against a hybrid tribunal such as the 
 
 174. See Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 96, at 385-86, 393-95; Peskin, supra note 153, at 679. 
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ECCC, which encompasses international as well as national personnel, 
many of whom have been working in Cambodia on matters related to the 
Khmer Rouge atrocities for decades and have a much better understanding 
of the political situation at hand.175 Cambodia also has an extremely 
dynamic civil society and the ECCC has ample scope for being able to 
hone its political radar by relying on the wealth of literature, surveys and 
reports, both current and those produced over the course of the years,176 
that provide empirical evidence for the various political positions. It can 
therefore factor in policy considerations in its decision making with more 
assurance and with far less fear of “Western” bias than the ICC can afford. 
Second, while the ECCC is a hybrid tribunal, it has more “national” 
presence in its laws, administration, and personnel than almost any other 
international or internationalized court. It therefore simply cannot afford to 
ignore its domestic constituency. This is not, however, a statement of 
despair, but rather an argument that should impel the international criminal 
law community to look more closely at the interests and incentives of its 
domestic constituency. While there has been some recognition even in the 
context of the ICC that international crimes are at the same time local 
crimes with local effects and costs flowing from whatever response is taken 
towards them by the international community,177 international law 
practitioners and academics are naturally more prone to being concerned 
about the long term effects of a single case of non-prosecution on global 
governance and deterrence efforts, rather than on immediate local 
exigencies.178 These local effects are far more acute and pressing in the 
case of a hybrid court such as the ECCC,179 which furthermore operates in 
 
 175. Steven Heder and Craig Etcheson, for instance, are both renowned experts on Cambodian 
history and politics and are currently associated with the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges and the 
Office of the Co-Prosecutors respectively. 
 176. For a sampling of various databases that carry literature and reports on the Khmer Rouge 
atrocities see Yale University, Cambodia Genocide Program, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/databases.html; 
Documentation Centre of Cambodia, Databases, http://www.dccam.org. 
 177. See Newman, supra note 170, at 346. 
 178. See, e.g., Akhavan, Disincentive to Peace, supra note 104, at 646 (arguing that the Acholi 
community in Northern Uganda with their desire for a grassroots victim centric approach is not the only 
interested party in the Uganda referral before the ICC; an amnesty for LRA leaders in Uganda could 
have devastating consequences for the much larger constituency of international criminal justice, for 
instance by damaging the ICC’s credibility in Africa and elsewhere). 
 179. Hybrid courts are partly preferred over international tribunals because they are usually located 
in the countries they serve, and thus are considered to contribute to building local capacity and suffer 
less from a legitimacy deficit. See Laura A. Dickinsin, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L. 
L. 295, 306-07 (2003); Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and 
National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 360, 367-68 (2006). 
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Cambodia, the site of the crimes, the perpetrators, and the victims. The 
hybrid structure may also have consequences for the roles that the 
international and national co-prosecutors can, and indeed were, expected to 
play in exercising their discretion on whom to prosecute.180 The ICC 
prosecutor and the international co-prosecutor of the ECCC can 
legitimately be more interested in prioritizing the long-term goals of 
international criminal law in achieving retribution and deterrence, at the 
expense of local short-term goals of reconciliation, and thus aim to cast the 
prosecutorial net fairly widely in the name of impartiality and creating a 
historical record.181 The same incentives do not operate for their national 
counterparts. National prosecutors operate in a very different political 
climate and are susceptible to influence by national executives and elite 
groups, making it unavoidable that they play by different rules, which 
sometimes cater to an exclusively national audience.182 Thus an inevitable 
concern of the national prosecutor is to construct a narrative of mass 
atrocity that suggests that responsibility for it was not widely shared, and 
especially did not extend to institutions or groups that have enduring 
political power and influence.183 These different interests are not only vital 
to factor in when assessing the roles of prosecutors working in international 
criminal courts as concerns their decisions on whom and how many 
persons to indict or prosecute, but the kind of evidence led, as well as the 
theories of criminal responsibility employed.184 Even more importantly 
perhaps, these seemingly divergent motivations of international and 
national actors engaged in international criminal prosecutions should invite 
a serious rethinking of the aims and purposes of the enterprise of 
international criminal law as a whole, which should seek to develop a more 
coherent conceptual account of what the discipline is trying to achieve. 
Third, the ECCC, unlike the ICC, does not contemplate any role for 
the Security Council in its functioning and, even if it were desirable to do 
so, cannot hope to outsource the problem of deciding when not to prosecute 
in the interests of national reconciliation to a political organ. In fact, the 
structure of the tribunal, as discussed earlier,185 expressly suggests that this 
was a matter to be considered by the co-equal prosecutors, and in the event 
 
 180. See Rose, supra note 76, at 2. 
 181. See Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1815-17, 1822 (2005). 
 182. See id. at 1820, 1826. 
 183. See id. at 1806-07. 
 184. See id. at 1806-29. 
 185. ECCC law, supra note 5, art. 20 new; ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 58, at 50. 
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of a dispute, the task of final adjudication would rest with the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. The negotiating history of the ECCC Agreement moreover 
indicates that the Prosecutors were meant to take into account the needs of 
national reconciliation in choosing whom to prosecute.186 Thus, a political 
or policy function was consciously entrusted to the ECCC prosecutors, with 
a clear oversight by a judicial body. 
All these factors suggest that local political considerations, especially 
domestic peace and stability, are elements that were meant to be taken into 
consideration in the ECCC trial process, and that the ECCC co-prosecutors 
were the first organ within the tribunal’s structure to be charged with this 
function in their decision on whom to prosecute. The unique structure of 
the tribunal, the history of its establishment, and its need to balance 
domestic as well as international interests in its functioning dictate that 
rather than taking away from its legitimacy, heeding these concerns would 
lend it greater efficacy and authority. The crucial issue is to what extent it 
would be appropriate to let these factors override the ECCC’s mandate of 
ensuring accountability for the crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge. 
The similarities between the ECCC and the ICC are of assistance in 
answering this question. While both tribunals, as well as other international 
criminal courts, are undoubtedly envisaged as one component of the 
various mechanisms a society may employ in order to move from a conflict 
society to a stable one, their own mandate is a very specific and limited 
one—to hold accountable persons allegedly responsible for having 
participated in mass atrocities in the setting of a criminal trial. This is in 
some ways an obvious point, but one that cannot be emphasized enough, 
given the increasing tendency to view international tribunals as a magic 
antidote to all that ails a post-conflict society. This mandate should not be 
discharged carelessly or in disregard for other equally pressing concerns in 
these societies, but must nevertheless form the priority for international 
tribunals. This default position is already implicitly recognized in the 
constitutive instruments of the ECCC as well as the ICC. Both charge a 
judicial body with assessing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to 
proceed with a case because of countervailing factors such as national 
reconciliation. Given the default presumption in the ECCC that the 
prosecution should go forward, a requirement that the ECCC Prosecutor 
has to demonstrate “substantial reasons” for a decision not to prosecute, 
similar to that of the ICC Prosecutor, should be adopted. In addition, one 
can build upon the debate on the legitimacy of alternative justice 
 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. 
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mechanisms that would justify non-prosecution in the context of the ICC, 
to develop standards by which the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber would be 
guided in its assessment of these substantial reasons. I propose a set of 
negative as well as positive guidelines that should guide prosecutorial 
discretion and which would render its exercise capable of rational 
evaluation by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
The negative guidelines require that the prosecutorial discretion 
should not be discriminatory or exercised in bad faith.187 The duty of the 
Prosecutor to be fair and impartial has already been recognized in some 
decisions by tribunals.188 In general, the accused would need to show 
evidence both of an unlawful or improper intent, as well as how the 
exercise of that intent has a discriminatory effect, such that other similarly 
positioned individuals were not prosecuted based on impermissible grounds 
such as ethnicity or religion.189 This is in keeping with the prosecutor’s 
discretion to choose the individuals and crimes worthy of judicial attention, 
given the limitations of the court’s financial and human resources.190 The 
standard of proof should also be demanding. Evidence must be adduced 
from which a clear inference can be drawn that the Prosecutor was 
motivated by a discriminatory desire. Further, in order to establish 
discrimination, the appropriate comparison must be between individuals 
who are similarly situated.191 Thus, in the present scenario, it would need to 
be proved that the national Prosecutor was acting with an impermissible 
motive in not proceeding with the additional indictments and that the non-
prosecution of the potential suspects has the effect of unlawfully 
discriminating between them and the accused currently before the tribunal. 
Factors that would be unacceptable bases for discrimination would include 
the political influence exerted by the accused in Cambodian society and 
their ties to the current military or government institutions. 
In order to formulate positive guidelines for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, I rely heavily on constitutional rights theory and 
the exercise undertaken by courts when confronted with conflicts between 
fundamental or constitutional rights, or between these rights and competing 
 
 187. See Danner, supra note 4, at 536-37. 
 188. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 94-96 (June 1, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision, ¶ 68 (Mar. 31, 2000) (Separate 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). 
 189. See Akayesu, supra note 188, ¶ 96; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, ¶ 611 
(Feb. 20, 2001). 
 190. See Akayesu, supra note 188, ¶ 94; Delalic, supra note 189, ¶ 602. 
 191. See Delalic, supra note 189, ¶ 611. 
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important and sometimes compelling state interests. While there are 
individual significant differences and points of tension, a significant 
proportion of courts around the world favor some form of “balancing” or 
“proportionality” analysis in order to resolve these conflicts.192 It is not my 
purpose here to enter into a detailed justification of balancing as an 
appropriate adjudicative device for deciding on matters related to 
constitutional rights.193 Instead, I draw support, in particular, from the 
influential work of Robert Alexy194 in extracting principles for a balancing 
test in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.195 Alexy’s theory of 
proportionality in the context of constitutional rights takes as its starting 
point a recognition of constitutional rights as “principles” rather than 
“rules.” Rules are definitive commands—norms that can either be fully 
realized or not. A conflict between rules can therefore only be addressed by 
either creating an exception to one of them, or declaring either to be 
invalid.196 In contrast, the conception of constitutional rights as principles 
understands rights as “optimization commands,” that is, norms requiring 
that the rights be optimized or realized to the greatest possible extent given 
the “legal and factual possibilities.”197 Optimization given the factual 
possibilities involves the principles of “suitability” and “necessity.” 
 
 192. See generally Steven Greer, “Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights: A 
Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate, 63 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 412 (2004); DAVID M. BEATTY, THE 
ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004); NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN 
EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1996); T.Alexander Aleinikoff, Constititutional Law in the 
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943, 967 (1987). 
 193. Thoughtful critiques of balancing as a method in constitutional rights reasoning from a 
conceptual, historical and institutional point of view include Aleinikoff, supra note 192; Richard H. 
Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS 
L.J. 711 (1994); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 256-59 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996). For an excellent 
summary of the primary arguments regarding balancing from a comparative constitutional law 
perspective, see Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2007). 
 194. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers trans., 2002). Alexy’s 
theories have been widely debated since the publication of his book in Germany and elsewhere. For a 
representative sample, see the collection of essays in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY (George Pavlakos ed., 2007). 
 195. A less developed and slightly different use of Alexy’s theory has been proposed by Kai 
Ambos in the case of amnesties. See Ambos, supra note 85, at 54-57. Ambos’s adaptation of the theory 
to the peace versus justice debate differs greatly in substance from my own, not least in imposing 
certain material and personal jurisdiction limitations on its application. Ambos also fails to discuss any 
principled reasons for his appropriation of Alexy whereas I see the value in acknowledging that neither 
peace nor justice need be values that have an absolute character. 
 196. Robert Alexy, On the Structure of Legal Principles, 13 RATIO JURIS 294, 295 (2000) 
[hereinafter Alexy, Legal Principles]. 
 197. Id.; Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131, 135 
(2003) [hereinafter Alexy, Constitutional Rights]. 
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“Suitability” is violated when a measure m is adopted in order to promote 
right x, but is not suitable for this purpose and instead obstructs the 
realization of another right or goal y.198 “Necessity” requires that when 
measures m and n are both equally suitable for promoting right x, then the 
measure that would least interfere with principle or goal y should be 
adopted.199 Optimization, in light of what is legally possible, involves what 
Alexy labels “proportionality in the narrow sense” or the rule of balancing: 
“the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to one principle, 
the greater the importance of satisfying the other principle.”200 
The particular merit of Alexy’s analysis in the context of the peace 
versus justice debate lies in its recognition that principles or statements of 
value need not be of an absolute character but can take the form of 
balancing norms that are sought to be realized to their fullest extent given 
other considerations, and that this fact does not denude them of their moral 
stature. Alexy’s analysis would need to be adapted to take into account the 
need for the presumption in favor of prosecution alluded to earlier. Thus, 
the burden of proof in the balancing exercise between prosecutions before a 
tribunal versus alternative measures or the possible endangerment of peace 
would lie on the party advocating the latter. In order for the Prosecutor to 
defer prosecutions in the interests of peace or national reconciliation, he 
would have to demonstrate (a) that non-prosecution is being adopted in 
order to promote the goal of national reconciliation (or any other goal that 
he considers a vital interest) and that this is a suitable measure for 
achieving this goal; (b) that of all the measures that are open to the 
Prosecutor, non-prosecution is the one that would least interfere with the 
aim of preventing impunity and encouraging general as well as specific 
deterrence; and (c) the greater the adverse impact on the aim of prevention 
of impunity and establishment of a global norm of deterrence, the greater 
should be the importance of preserving peace or national reconciliation in 
the particular situation. 
Let us see how this test may be operationalized in the context of 
Cambodia. Since in the ECCC’s case, it is the national Co-Prosecutor who 
is arguing for non-prosecution, the burden of proof would be on her to 
adduce grounds to substantiate this claim. As mentioned earlier, of the 
 
 198. Alexy, Legal Principles, supra note 196, at 297-98; Alexy, Constitutional Rights, supra note 
197, at 135. 
 199. Alexy, Legal Principles, supra note 196, at 297-98; Alexy, Constitutional Rights, supra note 
197, at 135-36. 
 200. Alexy, Constitutional Rights, supra note 197, at 136; see also Alexy, Legal Principles, supra 
note 196, at 298. 
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three grounds alluded to by the national Co-Prosecutor, the only one that 
would even qualify for the proportionality analysis is that additional 
prosecutions would undermine national reconciliation.201 The first step of 
the proportionality analysis would therefore be an assessment of non-
prosecution of the additional suspects as a suitable measure for achieving 
national reconciliation. In this exercise, it would be of vital importance then 
for the national Prosecutor to first outline what she views as “national 
reconciliation.” This concept rarely commands a clear definition. While it 
is perhaps easier to define what would constitute a disruption in political 
stability or civil war or armed conflict within a country as a potential fall 
out of a prosecution effort, national reconciliation is a more amorphous 
concept.202 An understanding of reconciliation can range from a fairly 
content-thin one to a richer more full-blown concept.203 Various definitions 
stress different aspects of reconciliation: mere peaceful co-existence; 
achieving a “narrative equilibrium” between contradictory accounts of 
events;204 the development of viable democratic institutions;205 and a quasi-
religious concept that involves confession, contrition, forgiveness, and 
restitution.206 Regardless of where one chooses to place oneself on this 
spectrum, it is widely accepted that ersatz forms of “reconciliation” that 
involve denial or lack of acknowledgement by perpetrators of the injustices 
committed by them against those harmed would not meet the minimum 
requirement of the establishment of sustainable trust between parties that is 
a prerequisite for reconciliation.207 
The national Co-Prosecutor would thus need to prove that non-
prosecution of additional suspects is suited to achieving the building of 
lasting trust between alleged perpetrators and victims, and contributing to 
enduring peace and stability in Cambodian society. Naturally, one cannot 
 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 72-85. 
 202. See, e.g., Piet Meiring, The Baruti Versus the Lawyers: The Role of Religion in the TRC 
Process, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 123 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000) 
(discussing the debates regarding the work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission). 
 203. Crocker, supra note 84, at 60-61. 
 204. Susan Dwyer, Reconciliation for Realists, 13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 81, 89-91 (1999). 
 205. See Trudy Govier & Wilhelm Verwoerd, Trust and the Problem of National Reconciliation, 
32 PHIL. OF THE SOC. SCI. 178, 184 (2002) (citing Jakes Gerwel, the former director general in the 
office of President Mandela, as acknowledging that before the work of the TRC in South Africa, 
reconciliation was understood as the formal political and constitutional unity of the country). See 
generally Jonathan Allen, Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 315 (1999). 
 206. See Govier & Verwoerd, supra note 205, at 180 (citations omitted). 
 207. See id. at 183; Mendez, supra note 2, at 273-74. 
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expect the Prosecutor to demonstrate an exact causal relationship between 
non-prosecution and national reconciliation. Also, local actors are likely to 
be better placed to decide on the form of national reconciliation (excluding 
false reconciliation efforts) most suitable and practicable for their particular 
social and political situation. It would thus be appropriate for the ECCC to 
accord a “margin of appreciation”208 to the national Prosecutor in 
evaluating the need for reconciliation and the measures required for it, as 
long as this is based on robust engagement with persons directly affected 
by this decision, especially victims, in reaching this conclusion. The 
national Prosecutor will also, at the very least, have to persuade the court 
that even though prosecutions that have already commenced did not 
adversely affect national reconciliation, further prosecutions will do so. 
At the second stage of the balancing exercise, the national Co-
Prosecutor would have to demonstrate that of all the measures that could 
have been taken to promote national reconciliation, non-prosecution of 
additional suspects would involve the least interference with the goal of 
prevention of impunity and deterrence of mass atrocities. This is perhaps 
one of the most difficult challenges for the national Co-Prosecutor, given 
that the Cambodian government has largely failed to enact any other 
measures aimed at promoting reconciliation. The integration of the Khmer 
Rouge cadre into the government forces and the cessation of armed conflict 
were taken by the government to have achieved reconciliation and it 
emphasized forgetting and forgiving of the past, instead of making any 
effort to truly undertake social repair.209 Ironically, the establishment of the 
ECCC and its prosecution of those considered most responsible for the 
Khmer Rouge atrocities was itself considered as part of the project of 
reconciliation. Most other measures aimed at reconciliation have been 
introduced by civil society groups active in Cambodia. Notable among 
these is the institution of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (“DC-
Cam”)210 which documents and preserves the history of the Khmer Rouge 
 
 208. On the doctrine of “margin of appreciation” used by the European Court of Human Rights, see 
generally, Michael R. Hutchinson, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of 
Human Rights, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 638 (1999); George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of 
Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL. STUD. 705 (2006). On extending the margin of appreciation to 
apply as a general doctrine in international law encouraging restraint by international judicial authorities 
when evaluating national decisions, see Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005). 
 209. Linton, supra note 84, at 12. 
 210. DC-Cam was initially founded by an Act of the U.S. Congress in 1994, which established the 
Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations. The Office gave grants to Yale’s Cambodian Genocide 
Program to conduct research into Khmer Rouge atrocities, leading to the formation of DC-Cam as a 
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regime for posterity and which was instrumental in compiling and 
organizing information that now serves as one of the primary sources of 
evidence for the ECCC prosecution process.211 Cambodia could have 
pursued any number of measures directed towards the goal of 
reconciliation; standard measures including the establishment of 
democratic institutions, public acknowledgements or apologies for past 
wrongs, post-conflict mediation efforts between different parties, 
commissions of enquiry, reparations programs, and government programs 
that focus on victim rehabilitation.212 It is difficult to see how any of these 
would have adversely impacted the achievement of deterrence or 
prevention of impunity. The national Co-Prosecutor would be hard-put to 
justify why, when the government chose not to implement any of the above 
measures in its stated reconciliation policy, it now wants to argue that non-
prosecution of additional suspects would be the least detrimental way to 
achieve reconciliation, even though it may have a negative impact on the 
goals of international criminal prosecutions. 
The third and the final step in the analysis would involve a balancing 
exercise or proportionality in the narrow sense between the positive impact 
on reconciliation and the negative effect on impunity prevention and 
deterrence. The greater the negative impact on the latter, the stronger must 
be the evidence supporting the claim that non-prosecution of additional 
suspects would promote national peace and stability. It is important to note 
here that the negative impact would be assessed not only in light of the 
situation in Cambodia and prospects for the establishment of a society 
based on the rule of law in Cambodia, but also the long reaching and wider 
global impact of non-prosecution of accused against whom there is enough 
prima facie evidence to suggest that they committed horrific war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. 
This proportionality exercise I propose is intended as a device for self-
evaluation by the prosecutor of an international criminal court, who is 
caught in the unhappy situation of having to choose between prosecution 
and peace, and has to justify this choice. It is also suggested as an 
adjudicative tool that can be employed by the court in deciding whether the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion has been guided by objective and 
 
field office of the program in 1995. It became an independent Cambodian research institute in 1997. 
History and Description of DC-CAM, http://www.dccam.org/Abouts/History/Histories.htm (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2009). 
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 212. Govier and Verwoerd, supra note 206, at 182 (footnote omitted). 
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rational standards that further the ultimate goal of international criminal 
justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Given that international and hybrid criminal tribunals are of relatively 
recent vintage in the realm of international law and relations, their speedy 
ascent to the top of the pecking order of mechanisms to deal with mass 
atrocities is nothing short of astonishing. Ubiquitous and multifaceted, 
there seems to be no limit to what they are expected to achieve—in 
addition to the usual goals of criminal justice, they are tasked with 
achieving peace, telling a much contested truth, creating historical records 
for societies, and educating the world against the horrors of mass violence. 
The proposals in this paper with respect to the ECCC betray a far 
more modest concept of a criminal tribunal as only part of the complex and 
shifting strategies that are needed to address the causes and consequences 
of conflict. It is this vision that holds that the mandate of the tribunal is, 
first and foremost, to achieve accountability. It cannot, however, reach this 
goal in a vacuum and must be conscious of the political context in which it 
operates and be prepared to accommodate, and if necessary defer, to other 
mechanisms and processes that complement its quest to establish a stable 
society based on the rule of law. Particularly in the context of a hybrid 
tribunal such as the ECCC, this entails due respect for national needs such 
as reconciliation, recognition of the interests motivating national actors, 
and giving voice to the interests of people who will be most affected by the 
processes of the tribunal. These factors will operate with varying intensity 
depending on the composition and structure of different tribunals and the 
societies in which they operate. 
This conflict between values is not unique to the arena of international 
criminal justice, but is pervasive in the law, and is ultimately a reflection of 
the incommensurability at times of the various purposes that the law seeks 
to achieve and on which reasonable people can differ. While it may then be 
naive to assume that these conflicts can always be resolved in a manner that 
provides for a single appropriate solution, the construction of an objective 
and principled methodology that can make sense of this 
incommensurability and assist in resolving conflicts is a worthy and 
necessary enterprise. I have proposed an impartial way for prosecutors and 
judges to be able to balance these legitimate concerns against the demands 
of prevention of impunity through a balancing or proportionality analysis 
that views both prevention of impunity and promotion of deterrence 
through criminal trials on the one hand, and the pursuit of peace and 
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national reconciliation on the other, as values or principles that should be 
optimized to the greatest possible extent. This is, however, simply the 
beginning of a much larger project that must engage more deeply with 
theorizing international criminal law to develop a comprehensive account 
of its aims, methods, and limits. 
 
